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I. INTRODUCTION
In civil law, not unlike in common law, within the field of civil
liability,' one generally distinguishes contractual liability from tortious
liability,2 even though some legislatures provide general rules applicable
to both contract law and tort law. The German Civil Code, for example,
dedicates sections 241 through 304 to the Schuldrecht im allgemeinen,3
i.e., to obligations in general; the Italian Civil Code, unlike the French
Civil Code which is based on the Institutionensystem,4 does so as well
in Italian Civil Code articles 1173-1320. Nevertheless, even in those
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1. In civil law systems today, unlike in Roman law, civil liability is generally
distinguished from criminal liability, even though it has been said that "while every lawyer
feels that there are obvious differences, none can state in exact terms what they are."
Sir Percy Henry Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort 190 (1931). See also, in
regard to this distinction, Andr6 Tunc, Introduction, XI/l Int'l Enc. Comp. L. 29 (1974),
where the author states that "[tioday, the distinction between tort and crime does not
give rise to any practical difficulty."
2. This distinction has been treated above all in French and Italian law. See, e.g.,
Brun, Rapports et Domaines des Responsabilit~s Contractuelle et D6lictuelle (1931); Ugo
Majello, ResponsabilitA contrattuale e responsabilitA aquiliana, in Fondamento e Funzione
della Responsabiliti Civile 12 (Buoncuore & Majello eds. 1975); Didier Martine, L'Option
Entre la Responsabilitd Contractuelle et la Responsabilit Ddlictuelle (1957); Maurice Rassat,
La Responsabilit6 Civile 7-10 (1981); Carlo Rossello, Intorno ai rapporti tra responsabiliti
contrattuale e responsabilitA extracontrattuale, Giur. It. IV 201 (1985).
For a treatment of the distinction under review by English legal writers, see, e.g.,
A.G. Guest, Tort or Contract?, 3 Malaya L. Rev. 191 (1961); Tom Hadden, Contract,
Tort and Crimes: The Forms of Legal Thought, 87 L.Q. Rev. 240 (1971); W.D.C. Poulton,
Tort or Contract, 82 L.Q. Rev. 346 (1966).
3. The German Civil Code (hereinafter BGB) is based on the so called Pandekten-
system, according to which a civil code should be divided in different parts: (1) a general
part, encompassing rules relating to all kinds of vincula iuris, as well as parts relating
to (2) obligations, (3) property, (4) family, and (5) succession.
4. The French Civil Code and Austrian General Civil Code, unlike most modern
civil codes, follow the division of the Roman Institutiones which were divided in three
different parts. Therefore the French Civil Code (hereinafter Fr. C. Civ.) is divided in
three books: Of Persons, Of Property and the Different Modifications of Property, Of
the Different Modes of Acquiring Property.
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legislatures, there are some differences in the rules governing contractual
and tortious liability in spite of an apparent crisis' of the distinction,
which crisis has been caused by the recent tendency to mitigate the
differences between these two types of civil liability.6 However, it is
doubtful whether this distinction can be abolished since "the distinction
finds a legal justification ' 7 in the fact that the two types of liability
are provided for, at least partly, in different titles of the various civil
codes. This is true, for example, in regard to the French,' the Italian, 9
5. It has often been said that the distinction between contractual and tortious liability
is actually characterized by a crisis. For similar statements, see, e.g., Claudio Turco, Brevi
considerazioni sul principio di prevedibilita del danno come profilo distintivo fra respon-
sabilitd contrattuale ed extracontrattuale, Riv. Crit. Dir. Priv. 93 (1987): Giovanna Visintini,
Responsabilit i contrattuale ed extracontrattuale (Una distinzione in crisi?), Rass. Dir. Civ.
1077 (1983).
6. Recently it has been stated that, in fact, the areas of those types of liability tend
to overlap and that consequently common rules should cover both liabilities, Guido Alpa,
Responsabilit& Civile e Danno 17 (1990). See, for further criticism in Italy, Francesco D.
Busnelli, Verso un possibile riavvicinamento tra responsabilitb contrattuale e responsabilitt
extrecontrattuale, Resp. Civ. e Prey., 748 (1977); Francesca Giardina, Responsabilitt
contrattuale ed extracontrattuale: una distinzione attuale?, Riv. Crit. Dir. Priv. 79 (1987);
Giuseppe Sbisi, Responsabilitb contrattuale e responsabilitb extracontrattuale, Rass. Dir.
Civ. I 109 (1988); Giuseppe SbisA, Responsabilitb contrattuale ed extracontrattuale: realtd
contrapposte o convergenza di presupposti e di scopi?, Resp. Civ. e Prey. 723 (1977).
The distinction under review has been criticized in France, as well. See, e.g., Tunc,
supra note 1, at 28, where the author, after having criticized the distinction between
contractual and tortious liability, states that the "unification of the rules governing them"
should be advocated. See also, Henri Mazeaud et al., 2(1) Lecons de Droit Civil 371-373
(1985).
7. Visintini, supra note 5, at 1077. For a similar evaluation, see Tunc, supra note
1, at 20, where, after having pointed out the existence of a justified skepticism toward
the distinction at issue, the author proclaims that "IfIrom the point of view of positive
law, the practical interests of the distinction and the combination of tortious and contractual
liability deserve to be studied."
8. As far as the French legal system is concerned, see, e.g., Philippe Malaurie &
Laurent Aynes, Droit Civil. Les Obligations 320-321 (1985), where the authors proclaim
that "the Civil Code has clearly distinguished the two types of liability. Their sources
cannot be found in the same place:
the rules relating to the tortious liability are concentrated in five articles (Art.
1382 to 1386); the rules relating to the contractual liability are scattered in
several provisions governing or specific contracts . .. or the general theory of
contracts (Art. 1142, 1145, 1184) and are loosely gathered in articles 1146-1155.
See also, Tunc, supra note 1, at 24, where it is stated that "the distinction between the
two liabilities is strongly entrenched in French law, being based on their treatment in two
different Titles of Book III of the Civil Code: Title III, on Contracts and Contractual
Obligations in General ... and Title IV on Liability Arising Outside Any Contractual
Obligation."
9. The Italian Civil Code treats contractual obligations in general in articles 1321-
1469, while tortious liability is governed by articles 2043-2059. See also, Visintini, supra
note 5, at 1077.
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and the German civil codes,'0 even though some of these codes provide
rules relating to obligations in general.
In civil law systems, the types of liability at issue differ from each
other, for instance, "in regard to the source, the fact upon which the
liability depends."" While there is contractual liability when there is
non-performance (or bad performance) of any obligation, at least in
the French-based systems, 3 there is tortious liability when a wrong has
been committed against a person to whom the tortfeasor had no ob-
ligation. 14
However, the source of the obligation to compensate for damage
is not the only element which distinguishes the two types of liability in
both civil and common law." The rules governing the burden of proof
also differ: while the victim of a tort has to prove the defendant's fault
in conformity with the principle actore incumbit probatio,6 in contract
law it is generally the defendant who has to prove that the non-per-
formance is not due to his fault," i.e., "the burden of proof falls on
10. Even though the BGB provides rules governing both contractual and tortious
liability, it also provides rules applicable only to contract law (BGB sec. 305-361) and
only to tort law (BGB sec. 823-853).
11. Giardina, supra note 6, at 79, 80.
12. According to this definition, both in Italy and in France, there is respectively
responsabilita) contrattuale and responsabilitJ contractuelle even when there is no contract
at all, such as in the case of the negotiorum gestio. In German law, however, there is
contractual liability only where there is a legal transaction; all other cases (such as a tort
or negotiorum gestio) give rise to legal obligations.
13. For a similar affirmation relating to Italian law, see, e.g., Pietro Rescigno,
Manuale di Diritto Privato Italiano 655 (1989). As for French law, see Rassat, supra note
2, at 8.
14. Only where there is no vinculum iuris between the defendant and the victim can
tortious liability arise. For a similar statement by Italian courts, see, e.g., Cass. civ.,
April 23, 1969; Cass. civ., October 29, 1988. For a comparable statement in French law,
see, e.g., Tunc, supra note 1, at 19: "The purpose of the law of tort is to oblige a
citizen to make compensation for damage he has unlawfully inflicted on another citizen
outside any contractual relationship." (emphasis added).
15. In common law, as well, it has been pointed out that the source of the two
liabilities is different. Indeed, generally it is stated that "no civil injury is to be classed
as a tort if it is solely a breach of contract .... Further, in tort the duty is towards
persons generally; in contract it is towards a specific person or persons." Sir John Salmond
& R.F.V. Heuston, The Law of Torts 12 (15th ed. 1969).
16. As for the Italian law, see, e.g., Alberto Trabucchi, Istituzioni di Diritto Civile
209 (1990). For the same rule in French law, see, e.g., Philippe Le Tourneau, La
Responsabilit6 Civile 127 (1976). In German law, too, the rule is the same; see Hans
Brox, Allgemeines Schuldrecht 146 (1987).
17. For the Italian law see Italian Civil Code art. 1218 (hereinafter Ital. Civ. C.).
In regard to French law, see Tourneau, supra note 16. As for German law, see BGB
sec. 282 quoted in the text.
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the debtor."' 8 Further differences relate, for example, to the rules gov-
erning the default: in civil law, a mise en demeure, a formal requisition
is generally required in order to consider the performance as being
unduly delayed.' 9 Generally, however, such a formal requisition "is not
necessary ... when the debt results from a tort." 20 Tortious and con-
tractual liability differ for other reasons, as well: the rules relating to
the interests for delay generally do not correspond. In contract law, the
right to damages for delay accrues on the day of the demand, 2' while
in tort law they are due from the day of the tortious event.2 Further-
more, the statute of limitations or prescriptive period of the various
claims differ: the period relating to contract law is longer2" "in order
to reach a broader protection (at least in regard to time) of the victim's
interest .... ''24
The rules relating to compensation of damages differ in the French-
based legal systems, unlike in German law. 2 Indeed, while in French-
18. BOB sec. 282. However, the burden of proof as an element which distinguishes
the two types of liability at issue has been criticized. See, e.g., Turco, supra note 5, at
94 n.5; Visintini, supra note, 5, at 1081-83. This criticism comes because there are several
important exceptions to the aforementioned rules. For a comparative overview of the
problems relating to the burden of proof in Germany, France and Italy, see Franco
Ferrari, AtipicitA dell'Illecito Civile 19-21 (1992).
19. See, for a similar affirmation, Sir Maurice Sheldon Amos and F.P. Walton,
Introduction to French Law 183 (3d ed. 1966), where it is stated that a "delay in itself
is not enough. It must be a delay officially noted . .. ."
20. Ital. Civ. C. art. 1219. For the existence of similar rules in both French and
German law, see, e.g., Amos & Walton, supra note 19, at 183; Brox, supra note 16, at
158; Le Tourneau, supra note 16, at 81; Malaurie & Aynes, supra note 8, at 345.
21. For this rule in France, see Fr. C. Civ. art. 1153(3): "They [damages and interests
from the delay] are only due from the day of the notice to pay, except in the case where
the law makes them run as a matter of law." John H. Crabb, The French Civil Code,
Translation With an Introduction (1977). For the existence of a comparable rule in Italy
and Germany, see Ferrari, supra note 18, at 22; Malaurie & Aynes, supra note 8, at 345.
22. See, for this rule in Italy, the decisions of the Italian Supreme Court, Cass. civ.,
October 20, 1984; Cass. civ., January 6, 1984; Cass. civ., October 25, 1982. As for the
French rule, see Civ., January 27, 1983. As far as German law is concerned, see Ferrari,
supra note 18, at 23.
23. In Italy, according to Italian Civil Code article 2946, the limitation period will
usually be ten years if there is a contract, five years if there is no contract. In France,
the time limits are respectively thirty years (Fr. C. Civ. art. 2262) and ten years (Fr. C.
Civ. art. 2270-2271), while in Germany the limits are thirty years (BGB sec. 195) and
three years (BGB sec. 852).
24. Giardina, supra note 6, at 79, 80.
25. While German law recognizes the aforementioned elements on the basis of which
contractual and tortious liability can be distinguished from each other, it does not dis-
tinguish as far as the law of damages is concerned. Indeed, "[tihe German law relating
to damages is very simple. The rules stated . . . apply to contracts, delicts and all other
obligations alike, except if a special rule provides for an exception for the individual
case." I E.J. Cohn, Manual of German Law 104 (1968).
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based tort law, 26 such as in Italy, for instance,27 the compensable damage
includes both foreseeable and unforeseeable damages. In French-based
contract law, the defendant is only bound to compensate the damages
which were foreseeable at the moment the contract was concluded. 21
And it is this rule, the "foreseeability" limit, and its history which this
article will examine in order to show that all the various rules which
are treated in the different countries under the heading of "foreseea-
bility" or "contemplation", even the Hadley v. Baxendale29 rule, have
a common source: The French law.
II. FORESEEABILITY AND CISG ARTICLE 74
A "foreseeability" limit has also been provided for by an "unusual
treaty":30 the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
("CISG"). 1 In fact, CISG article 74,32 after having stated, not unlike
26. As for the French cases, see, e.g., the decision of the French Cour de Cassation,
Civ., October 21, 1946; Civ., March 2, 1966; Civ., May 8, 1969. See also, Ferrari, supra
note 18, at 24.
27. See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 18, at 23-24; 11/2 Francesco Galgano, Diritto Civile
e Commerciale 307 (1990); Turco, supra note 5, at 93.
28. See, for this statement, Galgano, supra note 27, at 307; Giardina, supra note 6,
at 79, 80; Majello, supra note 2, at 14.'A similar statement can also be found in Amos
& Walton, supra note 19, at 185, where the authors state that the French courts "may
normally take into account only that prejudice which could have been contemplated when
the contract was concluded." One must, however, note that it is not correct to speak of
"contemplation," since the French Civil Code speaks of "foreseeability" (Fr. C. Civ.
art. 1150). As will be pointed out infra, there may be foreseeable events which are not
in the contemplation of the parties, i.e., speaking of contemplation reduces the scope of
application of the French rule.
29. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
30. Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley, 23 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 415, 415
(1989), states that the treaty is unusual "because it means that some, although not all,
contracts for the international sale of goods entered into by U.S. buyers and sellers will
be governed by conventional international law under one treaty."
31. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
April 11, 1980, 19 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 668, 671 (1980), entered into force January 1, 1988,
reprinted in Public Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-80 (1987). As of December 14, 1992, the
CISG entered into force in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Den-
mark, Federal Republic of Germany, Egypt, Finland, France, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Le-
sotho, Mexico, Norway, People's Republic of China, Spain, Sweden, Syria, United States,
Yugoslavia, and Zambia, Canada, Romania, Bulgaria, Guinea, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Ukranian S.S.R.
The literature on the CISG is nearly unlimited. For some commentaries, see, e.g.
Bernard Audit, La Vente Internationale de Marchandises (1990); Cesare M. Bianca et al.,
Convenzione di Vienna sui contratti di vendita internazionale di beni mobili, Nuove Leggi
Civ. Comm. 1 (1989); Commentary on the International Sales Law, The 1980 Vienna
Sales Convention (Cesare M. Bianca & Michael Bonell eds., 1987); Kommentar zum
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most legal systems, that the compensable damages encompass both the
damnum emergens and the lucrum cessans," lays down the rule that
such
damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion
of the contract, in the light of facts and matters of which he
then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence
of the breach of contract.
In regard to this rule, several German legal writers, such as Herber
and Czerwenka 4 and Reinhart" have stated that the rule of foreseeability
comes from the common law rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale.3 6
This hazardous statement," which corresponds to the German legal
scholars' tendency to interpret the CISG in light of the common law,
is based on the nonexistence of a similar concept in Germany. The
German Civil Code does not expressly lay down a foreseeability limit
on damages,38 even though before the Code came into force there were
Einheillichen Un-Kaufrecht- CISG (Ernst von Caemmerer & Peter Schlechtriem eds., 1990);
Francesco Galgano, II Diritto uniforme: la vendita internazionale, in Atlante di diritto
privato comparato 211 (Francesco Galgano & Franco Ferrari eds., 1992); Rolf Herber &
Beate Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht (1991); John Honnold, Uniform Law for
International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention (2nd ed. 1991); International
Sale of Goods (Peter Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1985).
32. CISG art. 74 corresponds to Art. 82 of the Convention Relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sales of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107.
33. Fr. C. Civ. art. 1149 expresses the rule mentioned in the text: "The damages
and interest due to the creditor are, in general, to the amount of the loss which he has
sustained and of the gain which he has been deprived ......
34. See Herber & Czerwenka, supra note 31, at 333, where the authors state that
"the limitation to the foreseeable damages comes from Anglo-American law."
35. See Gert Reinhart, UN-Kaufrecht 170 (1991).
36. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
37. The German scholars' opinion has been briefly criticized in Ferrari, supra note
18, at 25 n.76.
38. However, the idea of such a limit, even though it has not been expressly provided
for, seems to play a role in BGB sec. 254:
(1) If any fault of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the
obligation to compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation to be
made depends upon the circumstances, especially upon how far the injury has been caused
predominantly by the one or the other party.
(2) This applies also even if the fault of the injured party consisted only in an omission
to call the attention of the debtor to the danger of unusually high damage which the
debtor neither knew nor should have known, or in an omission to avert or mitigate the
damage.
For a similar affirmation, see Hermann Weitnauer, Vor Artt. 78-89, in Kommentar zum
Einheitlichen Kaufrecht; Die Haager Kaufrechtsiibereinkommen Vom 1. Juli 1964 540
(Hans Dolle ed., 1976).
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some legal writers who wanted such a "foreseeability" limit enacted. 39
In contrast, such a statement would never have been made in French-
based legal systems where similar rules exist. For example, the French
Civil Code states that "the debtor is only bound for the damages and
interest which were foreseen, or which might have been foreseen at the
time of the contract, when it is not in consequence of his fraud that
the obligation has not been executed.'"'4 A similar provision can be
found in the Italian Civil Code: "[U]nless the non-performance or the
delay depends on the debtor's fraud, the compensation is limited to the
damages which could be foreseen at the time when the obligation came
into existence." '4' The foregoing provisions, as well as the Louisiana
Civil Code, 42 use expressions similar to those used by the CISG, however,
there are some important differences. 43 The most important one relates
to the distinction, unknown to the CISG, between damages occasioned
with fraud and those occasioned without fraud. That distinction initially
could be found in the Draft on the Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts issued in 1992 as well," but it has been abolished in
favor of a principle comparable to the rule laid down in CISG article
74.45
III. HISTORY OF THE "FORESEEABILITY" LIMIT
A. Civil Law
The history of the "foreseeability" limit confirms that the principle
laid down in CISG article 74 cannot be a common law rule because
39. For the history of the "foreseeability" limit with special references to German
law, see, e.g., Detlef K6nig, Voraussehbarkeit des Schadens als Grenze vertraglicher
Haftung, in Das Haager Einheitliche Kaufgesetz und das Deutsche Schuldrecht. Kolloquium
Zum 65. Geburtstag von Ernst v. Caemmerer 75 (Hans G. Leser & Wolfgang Frhr.
Marschall von Bieberstein eds., 1973).
40. Fr. C. Civ. art. 1150. For a similar translation, see, e.g., George A. Berrmann
et al., French Law: Constitution and Selective Legislation (1989); Charles T. McCormick,
Handbook on the Law of Damages 563 n.10 (1935).
41. Ital. Civ. C. art. 1225.
42. See La. Civ. Code art. 1996: "An obligor in good faith is liable only for the
damages that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made."
43. In Italy, Bianca et al., supra note 31, at 300, stated that even the Italian expressions
appear to be comparable to the expressions used in the CISG, "however, there remain
important differences between our system and the system of the Convention."
44. See UNIDROIT Document (C.D. (72) 6) (1992) former Art. 6.4.5., which read
as follows: "The defaulting party is liable only for loss which he foresaw or could
reasonably foresee at the time of the conclusion of the contract would be likely to result
from his non-performance, unless this non-performance is deliberate or reckless (grossly
negligent)."
45. See UNIDROIT Document (Study L-Doc. 40 Rev. 10) Art. 7.4.4.: "The defaulting
party is liable only for loss which he foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at the
time of the conclusion of the contract would be likely to result from his non-performance."
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the source of the Hadley v. Baxendale rule can be found in French
law.
A vague attempt to limit the compensation of damages in contract
law to foreseeable damages was made in Roman law,4 but these attempts
were nullified by a constitution enacted in 531 A.D. by Justinian ac-
cording to which damages were limited ad duplum. 47 However, one can
consider this constitution as the "starting point" of the "foreseeability"
limit which can be found in many legal systems based on French law.
Indeed, in 1546 Dumoulin concluded that the rationale of the constitution
of Justinian was based on the fact that generally the debtor could
foresee only such damage, i.e., the duplum/ s On the basis of this
reasoning, Dumoulin established the general rule that compensable dam-
age resulting from a breach of contract had to be limited to foreseeable
damage. 49 And it is this conclusion to which Pothier referred when he
stated that "le d6biteur n'est tenu que des dommages et int~r~ts qu'on
a pu pr~voir, lors du contrat, que le cr6ancier pourrait souffrir de
l'inex6cution de l'obligation; car le d6biteur est cens6 ne s'etre soumis
qu'A ceux-ci.' ' 10 This rule was subsequently adopted by the Code
Napoldon" which, by serving as model to a number of other legal
systems, served as a "vehicle" for the transplantation of the rule of
foreseeability into numerous legal systems, such as those in Belgium,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and even, for a short period of time,
Switzerland. 2
46. See, as for the "foreseeability" limit in Roman law, Fritz Pringsheim, Zur
Schadensersatzpflicht des Verkaufers und des Kaufers, in 6 Studi in Onore di Salvatore
Riccobono 313 (1936). See also, Weitnauer, supra note 38, at 537, where the author
draws attention to a Roman source: D,19.1.43-44.
47. See, for a treatment of this problem, Dieter Medicus, Id Quod Interest 288-90
(1962).
48. For a similar affirmation, see also, Auguste Dumas, Les origines romaines de
Particle 1150 du Code civil, in 2 Etudes d'histoire juridique offertes A Paul Frederic
Girard 110 (1913).
49. See Weitnauer, supra note 38, at 537.
50. "The debtor is bound to pay only the damages and interests which one could
foresee, when the contract was made, as being possibly suffered by the creditor in non-
performing the obligation, because the debtor is considered as having accepted only these."
Oeuvres de Pothier 181 (1821).
51. For a complete treatment of the "foreseeability" limit in French law, see, e.g.,
I. Souleau, La Pr~vidibilitd du Dommage Contractuel (1979).
52. Even though the Swiss system is generally considered as being a German-based
legal system, the Swiss Code of Obligations (hereinafter CO), recognized the "foreseea-
bility" limit in its first version from 1881: "The debtor who is bound to compensate the
damages has to pay the damages which, at the moment the contract was concluded, could
be foreseen as being an immediate consequence of the non-performance or the Schle-
chterfullung of the contract." See also, Ernst Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs 479
(reprint 1964).
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B. The "Foreseeability" Limit and its Reception in American Law
Pothier, however, did not only influence the French-based civil law
systems. He influenced the common law rules as well, and this is one
reason why it is incorrect to state that the rule laid down in CISG
article 74 corresponds to a rule "invented" in the common law.53
Towards that end, one must note that Pothier's ideas were not
unknown to the English speaking legal scholars. In fact, in 1806 an
English translation of his Traitd des obligations was published. 4 And
it is this Treatise which has promoted the tendency to limit contractual
liability to the foreseeable damage not only in England, but also in
America where "in order to solve new legal problems one referred to
English law, as well as to civil law." 5 And it has been stated, that
towards this end, "Pothier's writings constituted, apart from the Louis-
iana Civil Code, the easiest way to access the legal tradition of the
European continent. 5 6
Pothier's influence in America, in regard to the "foreseeability"
limit, can be measured by looking at several court decisions which
explicitly refer to the French scholar. The earliest case in this regard
appears to be Blanchard v. Ely,5 7 a case decided in 1839, fifteen years
prior to Hadley v. Baxendale. In regard to the question under review,
the decision states that "our courts are more and more falling into the
track of the civil law, the rule of which is thus laid down by a learned
writer,"5 8 Pothier. Further cases can be found not only in the last
century,5 9 but in this century, as well: in Manss-Owens v. H. S. Owens
& Son (1 92 1)60 and Sinclair Refining Co. v. Hamilton & Dotson (1935)61
Pothier has been expressly referred to as the inventor of the rule which
limits contractual liability to the foreseeable damage.
53. See also, apart from the authors quoted in supra notes 34 & 35, Ingeborg
Schwenzer, Das UN- Abkommen zum internationalen Warenkauf, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift, 606 (1990).
54. Robert J. Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations (William D. Evans
trans., 1806).
55. K6nig, supra note 39, at 80.
56. Id.
57. Blanchard v. Ely., 21 Wend. 342 (N.Y. 1839).
58. Id. at 346.
59. For American cases referring to the French law as a source of the Hadley v.
Baxendale rule, see Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. 1845) (where judge
Nelson expressly refers to the English translation of Pothier's Traitg des obligations);
Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858); Jones v. George, 61 Tex. 345 (1884). For further
citations, see K6nig, supra note 39, at 82 n.41.
60. 105 S.E. 543 (Va. 1921).
61. 178 S.E. 777 (Va. 1935).
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IV. Hadley v. Baxendale
A. The Hadley Rule and French Source
The common law rule upon which CISG article 74 is wrongly
supposed to be based is, of course, the (immortal)62 English case Hadley
v. Baxendale,63 which has been defined by Gilmore as a "fixed star in
the jurisprudential firmament'"' and which consequently has influenced
varied legal systems, such as Israel, Scotland and South Africa. 6
In Hadley, a carrier agreed with a mill owner to transport a broken
engine shaft to the manufacturer in order to be used as a pattern for
the replacement shaft. The delivery of the shaft was delayed for five
days due to the carrier's fault. The carrier consequently was sued for
lost profits because the mill had to be shut down those extra five days.
However, the court decided that these consequential damages6 were not
compensable. On that occasion, the Court of Exchequer laid down the
learned rule, according to which
[w]here two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive
in respect of such breach of contract should be as may fairly
and reasonably be considered as either arising naturally, i.e.,
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of
62. See Murphey, supra note 30, at 417 n.5, where the author states in regard to
Hadley v. Baxendale, that "immortality-or at least a promising future-has been ascribed
to it."
63. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). This case, whose "exceptional pedagogical centrality"
has been pointed out, has been treated in several pages (Richard Danzig, The Capability
Problem in Contract Law (1978)). For recent articles, see, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 563 (1992); Larry D. Hause, An
Economic Approach to Hadley v. Baxendale, 62 Neb. L, Rev. 157 (1983); Janet T. Landa,
Hadley v. Baxendale and the Expansion of the Middleman Economy, 16 J. Legal Stud.
455 (1987); Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. Legal Stud. 39 (1981); Louis E. Wolcher, Price Discrimination
and Inefficient Risk Allocation under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 12 Research in
L. & Econ. 9 (1989); Wyatt McDowell Wright, Lost Profits and Hadley v. Baxendale,
19 Washburn L.J. 488 (1980).
64. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 83 (1974). One must note, however, that
Gilmore earlier had described the same decision as an "essentially uninteresting case,
decided in a not very good opinion by a judge otherwise unknown to fame." Id. at 49.
65. For a more critical statement, see Guenter H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of
Contract, VII/16 Int'l. Enc. Comp. L. 60 (1976): "it [the contemplation rule] has recently
been adopted in ULIS and in the law ... of Scotland, South Africa and Sri Lanka
though it is hard to say whether it originated in those countries as a Civil law concept
or whether it was accepted in them as a result of common law influence."
66. Note that "[t]here was, in effect, no claim for direct damages." Murphey, supra
note 30, at 429.
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contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.67
The erroneous statement made by German scholars that it is the
Hadley rule upon which CISG article 74 is based presupposes that the
Hadley rule itself is an innovative rule, an invention of the Court of
Exchequer. And indeed, it has been argued that the rule at issue can
be analyzed as a judicial invention in an age of industrial invention,68
i.e., as an invention linked to a society characterized by the industrial
revolution.6 9 However, as it results from the text of the decision rendered
by the Court of Exchequer, this view is not tenable: the Hadley rule
does not constitute a judicial invention in an age of industrial invention.
It constitutes rather the transplantation of a foreign rule, made necessary
by the age of industrial invention. This is the conclusion one must draw
from reading the text of Hadley v. Baxendale. It is apparent that the
judges of Hadley were aware of the aforementioned American case law 70
based on the French "foreseeability" limit,7 ' and that they were aware
of the French rule since they stated that "the sensible rule appears to
be that which has been laid down in France, and which is declared in
their code-Code Civil 1149, 1150, 1151. ''72
V. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing observations, one may say that CISG
article 74 is not based on the common law rule of Hadley v.Baxendale
because the Hadley rule itself is not a rule invented under common law,
as has been expressly pointed out in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Hamilton
& Dotson.7 The "foreseeability" limit
is known as the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale and is sometimes
spoken of as having originated in that case, though it is in
67. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
68. For a similar evaluation, see Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Bexendale: A Study in
the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 249, 250 (1975), where the author
states that the Hadley v. Baxendale rule "was invented in its particular form and in this
particular case, to assess the relationship between this judicial invention and the existing
legal and economic technology ..
69. Id. at 249.
70. The American case law has been made accessible to English lawyers by the treatise
of Theodore Sedgwick, Treatise on the Measure of Damages (1847).
71. See supra notes 57-61.
72. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147 (Ex. 1854).
73. 178 S.E. 777 (Va. 1935).
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reality an embodiment of civil law principles, and is substantially
a paraphrasing of a rule on the subject as it had been stated
at an earlier date in the Code Napoleon, by Pothier. 74
There are, however, further reasons which necessarily lead to the
thesis that CISG article 74 is not based on common law: the Hadley
rule, or contemplation rule, does not correspond at all to the rule laid
down in CISG article 74. In fact, while CISG article 74 refers to the
foreseeability of damages, the Hadley rule speaks of "contemplated"
damages. But by choosing the expression"foreseeable," the 1980 Vienna
Sales Convention, not unlike the French-based legal systems, intended
to widen the scope of recovery, i.e., to limit the application of Hadley.75
Furthermore, while CISG article 74 requires that the damage caused
must constitute "a possible consequence, ' 76 the Hadley rule presupposes
the damage as being "a probable result." There is other divergence
between the two rules, and again one can state that "the CISG ostensibly
widens the area of liability imposed upon the breaching party. '77
These brief observations should be sufficient to disprove the -state-
ment that the "foreseeability limit" as laid down in CISG article 74
corresponds to a rule which finds its source in common law rules. And
it is on the basis of this conclusion that one can divide all legal systems
74. Id. at 779.
75. See, for a similar affirmation, Murphey, supra note 30, at 435-436, where in
regard to the different expressions the author states that
[a] plain reading of the words suggests that a difference in the scope of liability
apparently is intended. Under Hadley, the damages must actually be "contem-
plated" and not merely "foreseeable." Thus, a rule that provides that damages
only need to be "foreseeable" surely ought to narrow the limitations of Hadley
and widen the scope of recovery.
76. One must also note that while CISG article 74 only takes into consideration "the
party in breach", the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale refers to the "contemplation of both
parties," As for this difference, see, e.g., Johann Tiling, Haftungsbefreiung, Haftungs-
begrenzung und Freizeichnung im einheitlichen Gesetz iber den internationalen Kauf
beweglicher Sachen, in Rabels Zeitschrift 259 (1968). See also Murphey, supra note 30,
at 435, where the author states that the difference is only apparent, since "[nlo case has
been found in which recovery was denied because the injured party did not foresee the
loss."
77. Murphey, supra note 30, at 440. See also Jacob S. Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions
in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law Perspectives, in International Sales:
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods sec.
9.05 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984), where the author refers to Lord Reid's
example in Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ld., I A.C. 350 (H.L.) (1969), in order to illustrate
the difference between "possible consequences" and "probable result": "to borrow from
Lord Reid's example in The Heron II, if one takes a well-shuffled pack of cards it is
quite possible, though not likely, that the top card will prove to be the nine of diamonds
even though the odds are 51 to I against."
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into four different categories: the countries which recognize the "fo-
reseeability" limit as laid down in French law; the countries which are
somehow based on the Hadley rule; the legal systems which ignore the
limit at issue, except for international sales contracts, such as Germany; 7
and those systems which do not recognize a similar principle at all.
78. As has already been pointed out, at supra note 38 and the accompanying text,
the German legal system does not expressly recognize a rule similar to the "foreseeability"
limit. See, for a similar affirmation, Treitel, supra note 65, at 60: "On the other hand,
the doctrine failed to take root in Germany where it is, at least nominally, rejected even
at the present day." See also Weitnauer, supra note 38, at 540. After the enactment of
the CISG, however, in Germany the "foreseeability" limit applies to international sales
contracts. However, one must note that in the former German Democratic Republic, the
"foreseeability" limit had been introduced before the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention came
into force. See, in this regard, the Law on International Economic Contracts (Kommentar
zum Gesetz Ober internationale Wirtschaftsvertrage) on February 5, 1976 sec. 297. See
also Hans Stoll, Art. 74, in Kommentar zum Einheitlichen Un-Kaufrecht-CISG, supra
note 31, at 611.
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